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Abstract—The emergence of cloud computing presents a 
strategic direction for critical infrastructures and promises to 
have far-reaching effects on their systems and networks to deliver 
better outcomes to the nations at a lower cost. However, when 
considering cloud computing, government entities must address a 
host of security issues (such as malicious insiders) beyond those of 
service cost and flexibility. The scope and objective of this paper 
is to analyze, evaluate and investigate the insider threat in cloud 
security in sensitive infrastructures as well as to propose two 
proactive socio-technical solutions for securing commercial and 
governmental cloud infrastructures. Firstly, it proposes 
actionable framework, techniques and practices in order to 
ensure that such disruptions through human threats are 
infrequent, of minimal duration, manageable, and cause the least 
damage possible. Secondly, it aims for extreme security measures 
to analyze and evaluate human threats related assessment 
methods for employee screening in certain high-risk situations 
using cognitive analysis technology, in particular functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). The significance of this 
research is also to counter human rights and ethical dilemmas by 
presenting a set of ethical and professional guidelines. The main 
objective of this work is to analyze related risks, identify 
countermeasures and present recommendations to develop a 
security awareness culture that will allow cloud providers to 
utilize effectively the benefits of this advanced techniques without 
sacrificing system security. 
Keywords—Cloud Computing; Human Threats; Multi Layered 
Security Strategy; Employee Screening; fMRI. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Cloud computing is the crest of the wave of new and better 
computing possibilities – provides, efficient and cost effective 
way to run governmental and commercial organizations. This 
technology is unique in its ability to address our national 
defense [1]. It offers critical infrastructures and intelligence 
agencies an emerging platform to deliver innovative mission 
solutions and assist in enhanced collaboration [2]. This 
platform underpins the next generation of digital products and 
services with reducing time and decreasing cost and giving 
these agencies the ability to purchase a broad range of IT 
services in a utility- based model to increase their operational 
efficiencies [3]. However, despite the myriad advantages of 
cloud computing, several security challenges still exist, such as 
malicious insider [4]. Insiders, by virtue of legitimate access to 
their organizations’ systems and networks, may pose a 
significant risk to critical infrastructure in cloud. It poses a 
significant risk and could gain complete control over the cloud 
services with little or no risk of detection. This paper will focus 
on malicious insider as a major threat in cloud security.  
Recent reports1 expose that violent extremists are trying to 
obtain insider positions in critical infrastructures. Based on 
these reports, it is clear malicious insiders pose a significant 
threat to cloud computing and critical agencies and government 
organizations are careful in adopting this new IT approach as 
moving to cloud could be challenging with due consideration to 
the sensitivity of data [1]. Cloud providers have an extreme 
interest in detecting malicious insiders to assure the protection 
of critical infrastructures. Despite much investigation into the 
motivation and psychology of malicious insiders, the fact 
remains that it is extremely complicated to predict this threat 
[5]. This presents cloud vendors with a dilemma to establish an 
appropriate level of trust w.r.t. employees. The objective of this 
work is twofold and the purpose is to alleviate above threats by 
focusing on two proactive approaches to overcome the 
aforementioned issues.  
The goal of the first section is to develop a framework that 
focuses on a multi-layered security strategy that can be used to 
better combat the risks of the insider threat to an organization’s 
networks, or information systems. This paper recommends that 
this strategy might be a necessary tool for cloud providers, 
policy makers, security officers and other stakeholders to 
identification and assessment of risk that insiders presents to 
organizations. Innovations in techniques and framework will 
enable cloud providers to successfully execute the mission of 
cloud computing. The next session is aiming for extreme 
measures to evaluate human threats related assessment methods 
for employee screening and evaluations using cognitive 
analysis technology, in particular functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI). The aim is to establish an 
appropriate level of trust at employees, effective monitoring 
and ensuring that insiders do not pose a foreseeable risk to 
critical infrastructure. The technological and non-technological 
outputs will ensure a better involvement of SME's as well as 
enhancing the competitiveness that enables users, ranging from 
SME's to government agencies, to experience a secure and 
trustworthy cloud computing experience.  
II. MALICIOUS INSIDERS IN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE - 
A THREAT TO CLOUD SECURITY 
Critical infrastructures are the advanced physical and cyber-
based systems essential to the state’s security, economic 
                                                        
1 http://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-InsiderThreat.pdf 
(IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,  
Vol. 04, No.05, 2013 
13 | P a g e  
www.ijacsa.thesai.org 
prosperity and social well-being of the nation, such as law 
enforcement services, power plants and Information and 
communication services etc. [6]. As a result of advances in 
technology, these critical infrastructures have become 
increasingly automated and interlinked. On the other side, these 
advances have created new vulnerabilities to physical and 
cyber-attacks by insiders. A report
2
 issued by the US 
Department of Homeland Security revealed that violent 
extremists are trying to obtain insider positions in critical 
infrastructure in the USA and the world and may increase the 
impact of any attack on the government assets. It further 
reveals that the fall edition of AQAP (a magazine published by 
Al-Qaeda) encourages followers to use “specialized expertise 
and those who work in sensitive locations that would offer 
them unique opportunities” to conduct terrorist attacks in the 
world.  
A recent study3 “2011 Cost of Data Breach Study: United 
States” reveals that insiders are the top cause of data breaches 
and 25 percent more costly than other types. Current events 
also expose that concerning cloud computing in the context of 
critical infrastructure, the threat of malicious insiders is very 
real. The cloud computing architecture is primarily a multi-
tenant, service based architecture that necessitates the creation 
of certain staff positions that can be a high risk in terms of 
internal security threats [2]. Moving data and application in 
cloud environment bring with it an inherent level of risk that 
allows insiders to steal the confidential data (such as 
passwords, cryptographic keys, clear text passwords from a 
VM’s memory, private keys from a VM’s memory etc.) of 
cloud users, sabotage of information resources and various 
types of frauds [4]. A cloud administrator’s access to the 
management VM makes these attacks possible [4]. Recently, a 
denial of service attack launched by a malicious insider against 
a well know Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud by creating 
twenty accounts and launching virtual machine instances for 
each. Using those accounts, malicious insider created twenty 
additional accounts machine instances in an iterative fashion 
and thus consumed resources beyond set limits [7]. 
There have been several recent events that exhibit how 
human operators undermined cloud computing. In December 
2010, Google has revealed that the accounts of Chinese human 
rights activists in Google’s clouds were targeted in a hacking 
attempt. As part of this investigation it was discovered that 
these accounts were not compromised through a security 
breach at Google, but most likely by a malicious insider. In 
another case4, David Barksdale, a 27-year-old former Google 
engineer, repeatedly took advantage of his position as a 
member of an elite technical group at the company to access 
users' accounts, violating the privacy of at least four minors 
during his employment. Security breaches by human elements 
in clouds are on the increase globally and there have been 
similar attacks at, e.g., RSA, Lush, Play.com and Epsilon 
                                                        
2 http://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-InsiderThreat.pdf 
3http://www.symantec.com/about/news/resources/press_kits/detail.jsp
?pkid=ponemon&om_ext_cid=biz_socmed_twitter_facebook_market
wire_linkedin_2011Mar_worldwide_costofdatabreach 
4 http://gawker.com/5637234/ 
around the world5. The sequence of scandals induced 2010 by 
the publication of classified government documents to the 
Wiki-Leaks website – in which volumes of sensitive 
documents were leaked by a trusted insider and ultimately 
published on an open website – has caused much 
embarrassment to the United States and other nations and 
represents the ultimate nightmare scenario for cloud vendors 
when considering the human aspect in cloud security [8]. It is 
indeed sobering to imagine that any organization could fall 
victim to such events and the damage malicious insider can do 
[8]. 
The exact security concerns rose from the LAPD (Los 
Angeles Police Department) when they decided to move to 
Google apps in November 2009 [7]. The security requirements 
included encryption of all data and background checks on 
employees who access the police database (e.g. criminal history 
records and fingerprints) could be vulnerable by malicious 
employees [7]. This data base is accessible to all police 
officials around the country. After more than two years of 
efforts, the city of LA has abounded plans in January 2012 and 
voted to scale back the contract to migrate its 13,000 law-
enforcement employees to office application platform and 
Google's hosted email, saying that security needs of crucial 
departments were not able to be met and concluded that cloud 
provider could not be brought into compliance with certain 
security requirements of the FBI's Criminal Justice Information 
Systems6. Instead, Google will pay up to $350,000 per year for 
the LAPD for the entire term of the contract due to the delay. 
Cloud providers need to face the reality that these threats 
are targeting critical infrastructure that could debilitating 
impact on state’s defense and a loss of public confidence in 
state’s services [3]. This could be a sign of growing pains as 
leading cloud providers are trying to get larger federal and 
government entities to go to the cloud and it also brings up 
questions about whether cloud service is really secure enough. 
III. MALICIOUS INSIDER IN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 
WHY CANNOT WE STOP IT? 
The “insider” is an individual authorized to access an 
organization’s information system, network or data - based on 
trust [9]. The insider threat refers to harmful acts and malicious 
activities that trusted insiders might carry out such as negligent 
use of classified data, unauthorized access to sensitive 
information, fraud, illicit communications with unauthorized 
recipients, and any other behavior that cause harm to the 
organization [10]. Insiders can be system administrator, 
contractors, former employees, suppliers, security guards and 
partner employees etc. According to Noonan & Archuleta [11] 
malicious insiders can be labeled as three different types of 
actors: 1) criminals 2) ideological or religious radicals; and 3) 
psychologically-impaired disgruntled or alienated employees. 
The motivations of malicious insiders can be simple illicit 
financial gain, revenge for a perceived wrong, or a 
                                                        
5 http://blogs.longhaus.com.au/cloudcio/2011/05/07/cloud-
computing-crisis-100-million-victims-of-cloud-privacy-breach/ 
6 http://blogs.longhaus.com.au/cloudcio/2011/05/07/cloud-
computing-crisis-100-million-victims-of-cloud-privacy-breach/ 
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radicalization for the advancement of religious or ideological 
objectives [11].  
To counter human threats, agencies have invested billions 
of Euros in different technical measures for years now [12]. 
The current security paradigms include access control and 
encryption to face malicious insiders and outsiders. They are 
implemented through passwords, physical token authentication 
and biometric authentication, firewalls, encrypted data 
transmission, data leakage prevention, behavioral-pattern threat 
detection, voice stress analysis and polygraphs. Various studies 
demonstrate that above devices and security software are 
normally designed to defend against external threats to secure 
critical infrastructure and do not protect against attacks aided 
by internal help in organizations [12]. An insider not only has 
the ability to obtain or access valuable data that resides on the 
internal network, but he/she can obtain this data from their 
workstation without causing suspicion or breaking trust. Cloud 
organizations are well aware of these issues, as demonstrated in 
a recent roundtable including senior staff as well as the sector’s 
major companies [13]. It is of utmost importance to adopt 
extreme measures to secure critical infrastructure in clouds to 
lower the level of threats. Secondly, well thought-out policies 
are necessary with understanding of the potential role of a 
process and methods – each designed to address threats 
targeted at specific segments of the cloud environment. Our 
research aims at alleviating this critical factor with higher 
assurance of achieving their desired security as employees at 
critical positions are may be, in some instances, the first and 
only line of defense and vital to national security. 
IV. MITIGATING INSIDER THREATS - TOWARD BEST 
PRACTICE ACTIONABLE FRAMEWORKS  
This part focuses on malicious insiders with a variety of 
specialized security solutions in supporting all aspects of user 
trust in clouds to mitigate human threats and for making better 
informed decision when choosing a cloud solution. Our 
actionable framework aims to mitigate the potential 
vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure in cloud computing and 
key resources to ensure its protection and resilience. To achieve 
this goal, this paper recommends policies and actions to detect 
and manage insider threats and effectively fight these 
problems.  
A. A Human Factor Vulnerability Assessment (HVA) 
Framewor. 
To mitigate malicious insider risks, this research 
recommends developing a human factor vulnerability 
assessment (HVA) framework. The purpose is to assess cloud 
organizational structure, its infrastructure, technical and non-
technical vulnerabilities, employee roles and responsibilities, 
actual events of human threats incidents and existing security 
measures. This framework will raise awareness of the 
malicious insider causes, potential indicators and prevention 
and detection strategies, and informing cloud providers and 
users of their security responsibilities. This research 
recommends to build a data base in HVA that will consist of 
various incident for malicious related activates, vulnerabilities, 
lessons learned, and physiological profiles or statistics 
regarding the insider and insider misuse, or social engineering 
activities in cloud computing. This assessment may provide 
indicators, practices, actions, policies and procedures so cloud 
organization can track changes in their capabilities related to 
human threats over time and possible mitigation strategies. The 
assessment’s results will benefit all individuals involved in this 
process and enable cloud providers to gain a better 
understanding of vulnerabilities in their clouds. The framework 
must include low-cost, easily implemented policy solutions for 
cloud vendors that have long term effects. These security 
awareness and training programs will be paramount to ensure 
that cloud providers and users will understand their security 
responsibilities to mitigate social engineering threats, and 
properly use and protect the cloud resources entrusted to them. 
This security plan ought not to be static; it has to be refined and 
adjusted regularly as the security challenges of cloud data 
centers permanently will change. 
B. Counter-Insider Threat Database 
This database may include cloud users, security personnel, 
technical/non-technical staff, administrators, and all levels of 
organization management into a single, actionable assessment 
framework. Based on this database, HVA will analyze the 
newest approaches to topics related to human factors involved 
in cloud security by means of reviewing relevant publications 
and security surveys. It may also take into consideration the 
incidents knowledge and the opinion of security experts, 
psychologists and stakeholders, in order to find the real nature 
and magnitude of the malicious insider and social engineering 
problems to identify the best practices including individual and 
organizational actions and responses. It is important to compile 
a database in this phase with criminal cases in which current or 
former employees, contractors, or business partners abused the 
trust and access associated with their positions. This database 
would work on cases of insider activity from the real world 
documented with many insider threat cases that may provide a 
rich source for empirical research on real cases of insider 
threat. In this regard, interviews with various victim 
organizations as well as with perpetrator are necessary, 
complementing a wealth of case data with first-hand insights 
into the methods and motivations behind these crimes. 
 Secondly, the collaboration with noted psychologists and 
others from the law enforcement agencies to uncover key 
technical, social, and organizational patterns of insider 
behavior may severely hamper understanding of the magnitude 
of the problem and development of solution strategies. Insider 
misuse, abuse and malicious activates are yet another 
manifestation of betrayal of trust behavior for which cloud 
organization must be alert in espionage cases. The 
psychological profile will provide managers, security 
specialists and medical personnel a profile of the insider, which 
may become a useful tool to enable them to identify potential 
abusers before they cause serious damage This knowledge will 
investigate the objectives, data-driven examination of the 
motivations and behavior patterns of malicious/outsider human 
threats, as well as organizational issues that may influence 
them. Leveraging data to prevent, detect, and respond to these 
threats can help cloud organizations to strengthen the 
protection of the critical infrastructure in cloud. Potential 
benefits from developing an insider and outsider event database 
will focus on the need for improved detection, technical 
research priorities, and prevention through policies, education 
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and training. This valuation may provide reports (confidential 
and public) on the basis of this assessment with the observable 
indicators and information and guidelines that cloud providers 
need to develop, and a plan of action and security standards to 
increase their ability to prevent, detect and respond to human 
threats.  A unified database may be built that may consist of: 
a) Incidents 
b) Statistical findings and implications regarding 
technical details of the incidents 
c) Insider Planning 
d) Nature of harm 
e) Communication behavior and characteristics 
f) Vulnerabilities 
g) Lessons learned 
h) Physiological profiles 
i) Statistics regarding the insider and insider misuse or 
abuse 
j) Case studies regarding detection and identification of 
the insiders 
k) Social engineering activities to develop 
recommendations for technology and policy solutions for 
future problems in cloud computing environment.  
At minimum, the following activities should be engaged for 
a Human Factor Vulnerability Assessment (HVA) framework: 
1) Identify categories of problems and analyze 
differences/similarities of cases. 
2) Provide administrators, security specialists a 
physiological profile of the insider/social engineer. 
3) To define significant characteristic types of insider 
misuse and assist in the development of questions for security 
investigations. 
4) Develop standardized framework and material for 
security education, awareness and training. 
5) Provide data for finer-grain access policies and 
differential access controls needed to help define what 
constitutes proper usage, thus facilitating the role of insider-
misuse detection. 
6) Develop recommendations for technology and policy 
solutions for future problems. 
The next sections will define how this framework will 
deliver organizations the means to support business continuity 
by better securing their assets through well founded decision 
making and therefore lower the overall risks associated with 
cloud computing. 
V. MULTI-LAYERED SECURITY STRATEGY 
This task may carry out a multi layered security strategy 
based on the Human Factor Vulnerability Assessment (HVA).  
After this initial step, evaluation of the security mechanisms 
must be developed to monitor compliance and effectiveness of 
this task to revise the specification and architecture according 
to the experimental results obtained with the database. Our 
security program identifies the four critical steps:  
1. Human Factor Security Awareness and Training 
Program Development 
2. Security Awareness and Training Material 
Development  
3. Security Program Implementation Consultancy 
4. Post-Implementation Security Program Consultancy 
and Periodical Evaluation 
A. Human Factor Security Awareness and Training Program 
Development:  
This step must identify: 
a) What are the plans for developing and implementing 
security awareness and training opportunities to mitigate the 
human factors in cloud that are compliant with existing 
directives? 
b) What awareness, training and education are needed 
to mitigate the human factors in clouds (i.e., what is 
required)? 
c) How are these needs being addressed by cloud 
providers? 
d) Where are the gaps between the needs? 
e) What is being done and what more needs to be done 
for gap analysis and targeting deficient areas for early 
rollout? 
f) Which needs are most critical in cloud environment? 
g) What are the roles and responsibilities of a cloud 
organization’s personnel will be identified in design and 
implementation stage to maintain security standards? 
h) Who should ensure that the appropriate employee 
attend or view the applicable material in cloud agency? 
i) Documentation, feedback, and evidence of learning 
for each aspect of the program; 
j) Gap analysis and targeting deficient areas for early 
rollout.  
 
B. Security Awareness and Training Material   Development:  
In this task we recommend to develop a standardized 
framework and material to identify: 
a) What skills we do want the cloud provider’s 
management and their employees to learn and apply to 
mitigate human threats? 
b) What behavior to reinforce? 
c) The topics may be covered in this approach are:  
1) Social engineering tricks 
2) Malicious insiders 
3) Shoulder surfing 
4) Dumpster diving 
5) Tailgating 
6) Access control issues 
7) Visitor control 
8) Physical access to spaces as well as handling 
incident response.  
 
C. Security Program Implementation:  
This approach will focus on the implementation of a multi 
layered strategy with: 
1) Trainings 
2) Programs 
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3) Education and awareness.  
4) Trainings: 
This scope of this section is to ensure that cloud providers 
and users are appropriately trained in how to face human 
factors in cloud environment. It must ensure that insiders with 
privileged access in cloud such as administrator are only 
required to undergo the same vetting procedures as other 
insiders. It is evident that the sensitivity of functions they 
perform and the potential to access the most sensitive 
information contained in the system are much greater than 
those without such privileges. It is particularly important to 
focus on developing a strong security partnership with system 
managers, ensuring that these individuals receive the best 
security awareness training available. Furthermore, it is 
important to ensure that: 
a) Awareness and training material is effectively 
deployed to reach the intended audience.  
b) Training material is reviewed periodically and 
updated when necessary and assist in establishing a tracking 
and reporting strategy.  
5) Programs:  
Security programs should recommend best methods, 
guidelines and technologies dealing with human factor issues. 
Some of our guidelines are: 
a) To recommend technologies and guidelines currently 
available for dealing with the insider/outsider problem. 
b) To establish an activity to evaluate on a continuing 
basis the effectiveness of available security methods and tools 
of all types that may be available to mitigate that risk. 
c) To direct the appropriate cloud providers to 
accelerate the development of new tools for cloud computing 
to combat insider and outsider threats. 
d) To develop robust policies to discarded floppy disks, 
and printouts etc. 
e) To propose different policies that classifies the 
sensitive information and enforces the mandatory and 
discretionary access control mechanisms. 
6) Education and Awareness 
This research identifies that many cloud operators lack an 
appropriate awareness of the threat insiders and social 
engineers pose to their operations. A strong security 
partnership is necessary to be developed. Education and 
awareness may present the biggest potential return for policy 
by motivating cloud operators and focusing their efforts to 
address the human threat. Our research attempts to enforce 
knee jerk policies to require all employees review the company 
policy after every three months, to acquaint themselves with 
revisions if any. Different activities are needed to be 
established to evaluate on a continuing basis the effectiveness 
of available security methods and tools of all types to mitigate 
that risk. Methods and techniques must be developed regarding 
discarded storage medium that may contain sensitive 
information. Appropriate awareness will help to shape the 
human threat policies and programs needed to address the 
unique insider risk profile. 
Techniques for Delivering Awareness Material:  
Techniques may include, but not limited to: 
a) Teleconferencing sessions 
b) Interactive video training 
c) Web based training 
d) Videos, posters (“do and don’t lists” or checklists) 
e) Screensavers 
f) Warning banners 
g) SMS/messages 
h) In-person 
i) Instructor-led sessions 
j) Awards program 
k) Letters of appreciation etc. 
STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP: It is recommended to arrange 
workshops for stakeholders involved in this whole process for 
intermediate results and panel discussion for feedback. 
PUBLIC WORKSHOP: Arrange workshops to recommend 
security personnel and cloud users a layered defense through 
use of guidelines and tools and how to develop an effective, 
comprehensive insider/outsider threat monitoring strategy.   
VI. WHO WILL WATCH THE WATCH MAN? 
In addition to above policies and framework, this paper 
suggests that it’s a mistake to rely just on preventive measures. 
Instead, it is essential to supplement them with monitoring and 
auditing so insider attacks can be detected and truly stopped by 
removing the attacker from the cloud organization. Although 
it’s difficult to prevent a malicious attack from a motivated 
insider, there are ways to spot bad behavior before it becomes a 
big problem. IT administrators make the cloud service and 
related datacenters operate, and through homogeneity and 
greater automation they often manage ratios of thousands of 
servers. The risk from these privileged cloud provider 
administrators must be explicitly recognized and addressed. 
There is a need to ensure that important location and data 
should not be reached and accessed by an individual and 
functions are not held by the same individual. Checks and 
balances implemented through review and approval processes 
are consistently applied so that gaps, even in critical situations 
are appropriately controlled and reviewed. Increased attention 
must be paid to privileged accounts, as it is mentioned earlier 
that how privileged administrators misused user’s data and 
applications by accident, for profit, or for retribution. Each 
employee has logical patterns of information usage, and the 
organization should look for abnormal usage and investigate 
when this occurs. For example, if an employee looks at 50 
customer accounts each day and then one day looks at 100 or 
more, there is a potential issue that should be investigated. You 
always need to understand if unusual behavior is warranted or 
malicious. Our strategy suggests that special monitoring and 
double auditing should be done to monitor abnormal or 
suspicious behavior by administrator or the damage that can be 
caused. 
However, we advocate that in the context of critical 
infrastructure, employment screening measures are necessary 
to implement by focusing on technical and psychological 
measures used in psychological research as well as in law 
enforcement domain to secure cloud data. This research 
propose that technical measure like, fMRI scanning must be 
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used for critical staff to detect malicious intent activities and 
susceptible behavior and other weaknesses (for instance, 
alcoholic, religious affiliation or domestic problems). This 
policy is needed to be implemented on pre-employment 
screening as well as regular employees. We propose that pre 
scanning measures such as reference checks can uncover prior 
criminal records, issues with character or credit problems. 
VII. MAINTAINING SECURITY USING FUNCTIONAL 
MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING (FMRI) 
The functional MRI is widely known and accepted in the 
scientific community as it does have a significant amount of 
scientific research behind its claims and validity. This 
technique relies on the fact that cerebral blood flow and 
neuronal activation are coupled. It involves placing the subject 
in a donut-shaped magnetic technology, which can identify 
subtle changes in electromagnetic fields [14]. During scanning, 
when an area of the brain is in use, blood flow to that region 
also increases [15]. Thus, its responses associated with 
neuronal activation correlate with cognitive tasks and various 
behavioral functions [15].  
An fMRI has already had a major impact on neuroscience 
and in clinical settings. It has been applied ranging from 
language comprehension to treatment of neurological 
impairment disease, psychiatric illness, aesthetic judgment and 
justification of cognitive enhancing drugs in educational 
settings [16].  With these rapid developments many researchers 
claimed this technology to be useful outside the laboratory 
settings. For instance, economic contexts, investing personality 
traits, mental illness, religious extremism, racial prejudice, 
suicidal thoughts aggressive or violent tendencies and truth 
verification [16] [17]. Proponents of this neuro-imaging 
technology hailed fMRI as the next “truth meter” and conclude 
that because of the novelty of the physiological parameters 
being measured, this technology may be more accurate than 
other traditional methods for employee screening (e.g., 
polygraph, see [18] [19] [20] [21]).  According to researchers, 
this ground breaking research proves that fMRI has the 
capacity to address the question of guilt versus innocence. 
Since the first publication by [21] on deception detection by 
fMRI, various papers and studies (See [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] 
[27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [33]) have reported different 
experiments in which subjects were asked to respond 
deceptively in some blocks and truthfully in others. It proved 
that lying involve more efforts than truth and expose that 
specific brain areas respond strongly in generating deceptive 
responses. As with lying, several brain regions show significant 
increases and light up on during scanning when a person sees a 
familiar object or image or during deception compared to truth 
telling [23]. For instance, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), ventroletral 
(VLPFC) and left and right cerebral hemispheres increases 
activity when people tell lies [31].  
FMRI truth verification in individual humans has been 
studied in 31 original peer reviewed scientific journal articles. 
These studies were done by 22 different research groups that 
included researchers from 13 different countries (USA, UK, 
Canada, Australia, China, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, and Russia). Similarly, 
during the employee screening phase, if any suspect employee 
is asked a question, the information to which is unknown then 
the specific regions of the brain is unusually active and it is 
presumed that suspect is lying; if, however, the same areas are 
no more active it may presumed that subject is telling the truth 
[18] [19] [20]. Thus, this technology has potential to reveal 
recognition regardless of whether the suspect speaks or 
attempts to conceal the recognition. 
Ruben Gur, a neuropsychologist at the University of 
Pennsylvania, states that fMRI scans can reveal cognitive tasks 
when a subject recognizes a familiar situation, object, or person 
connected with any fraud, theft of intellectual property, and IT 
sabotage, no matter how hard he or she tries to conceal it [17]. 
This cognitive analysis technology could function as a hyper-
accurate lie detector that is nearly impossible to deceive [35] 
[36]. For instance, an investigator could present a suspect with 
specific information such as of passwords, social security 
numbers, credit card information, other personal information, 
or other confidential corporate information [35]. This scientific 
technique allows intelligence operatives to focus their 
investigations on the suspects who actually commit crime and 
to determine if he or she has any un-authorized access to an 
organization's network or system before (See [22] [25] [26] 
[29] [33] [35]). On the other side, an information absent will 
provide support for the claims of innocence that employee is 
not guilty of committing any crime and has no knowledge 
specific to any data or any information [37]. This development 
will lead to speculations about the development of this neuro-
imaging technology that could directly examine the malicious 
insider memories, intentions and its mind.  
Interrogators will be able to confidently say that the fMRI 
told us this suspected employee lied about X or that he 
recognizes Y or fMRI picked him out as a malicious insider. 
This confidence that organizations will have in this 
neuroscience technique will be based on an aura of infallibility, 
scientific validity and objectivity [17]. Thus, unlike 
polygraph—which detects a person’s emotional response to 
deception—fMRI measures person’s decision to lie, as subjects 
cannot control their cerebral activity to avoid detection [38].  
Thus fMRI can be used as a tool warranted in employee 
screening as not only has this neuro-imaging technology taken 
the attention of scientific communities and law enforcement 
agencies but it has also attracted interest of corporate world 
[38]. Two private firms: No Lie MRI and Cephos Corp trying 
to make the dream of perfect truth verification into a reality and 
have begun marketing since 2006. They offer high-tech lie 
detection services based on research comparing neuronal 
activation patterns [14]. 
The future of cloud provider may very well be under 
construction with this new approach that is becoming a reality 
for mining of knowledge from suspected employee to assess 
potential threats rapidly. However, there are still significant 
concerns must be addressed prior to moving this technology to 
real-world application [16]. In addition to the scientific 
challenges, advances in fMRI identify numerous, human rights, 
social, legal and general public concerns to the process of and 
the science behind it [39]. 
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VIII. EVIDENCE-BASED POLICIES AND GUIDELINES: A 
RELIABLE RESPONSE TO EMPLOYEES CONCERNS 
In this research we are proposing best practices, 
recommendations and guiding principles to employ fMRI brain 
scanning technology during the questioning of suspects in 
cloud environment.  
1.   We recommend that, members involved in screening 
process must be made aware of the issues raised by this 
technology to develop best practices and efficient internal 
measures. These actions should address the development of 
policies and procedures relating to incidental findings within 
the doctrine of informed consent. Informed consent should be 
sought before scanning as the employees should be aware of 
the potential dangers. He/she should read, understand and sign 
an informed consent disclaimer to ensure that all the necessary 
requirements are met. This authority will give employee 
confidence and more control over the construction of their 
identities. Human experimentation without the consent of the 
subject is also a violation of human rights law [40]. To assure 
the protection, the fMRI scan process should undergo a 
complete government approval process to make reasonable 
assurance of employee’s safety. 
 
2.   Training of investigators is one of the major challenges for 
the implementation of this tool. This training is necessary for 
the evaluation of screening centers to appropriately protect 
employees while allowing for scanning. Thus, only trained 
experts will be required to evaluate subjects and conduct the 
scan.  
 
3.   Experts are ethically obligated to report to the appropriate 
authorities when they have reason to believe that employee 
screening is coercive and violating human rights. They must 
ensure that if experts do not detect any abnormal behavior, the 
subject is not harmed. However, if an abnormality is detected, 
the results of the scan should be analyzed by other highly 
trained neuroscientists and possibly rectified [43]. 
 
4.   It is also important that professionals involved in screening 
will be required to acquire security clearances. This shield will 
make it impossible for them to share the findings with 
colleagues in unclassified settings [43].  
 
5. This research recommends that “Certificate of 
Confidentiality and Privacy” that can make a difference in the 
screening context. This certificate will allow the members who 
have access records to refuse to disclose identifying 
information at the civil, criminal, legislative, federal, state, or 
local level if the employee is not guilty. Disclosure of 
sensitive information could have adverse consequences on 
innocent person’s reputation, employability as well as 
financial standing [41]. This document will particularly 
encourage employee to participate in the scanning process. 
 
6.  Any pre-employment screening process must be 
compatible with all relevant legislations, for instance, 
employee’s right must be protected by Article 8 7  of the 
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and 
Article 128 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 
process must implement the United Nations International 
Labor Organization (ILO) code of practice on the Protection 
of Workers’ Personal Data (1996)9 as well as European Union 
Guidelines 95/46 and 97/66 on data protection. 
 
 7.   It is important that organizations must ensure the safety of 
the subjects through the systematic monitoring of the 
international law and human rights – including the United 
Nations Conventions against Torture, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. The agencies must also 
consider the nuances of the Geneva Conventions as applied to 
suspected terrorists [42]. 
 
8.   Question should be limited to a verification of the “real” or 
“personal” identity such as education, employment history, 
court records, credentials and other data associated with an 
employee. In screening process, the access to the results 
should be restricted for investigators in order to prevent the 
misuse of these preliminary data.  
 
9.   Uniformed personnel’s and medical experts who are 
engaged in screening panel using fMRI must be held to 
account for their actions if they have violated human rights 
laws. Innocent employees or victim of this technology must be 
offered compensations, health care services and a formal 
apology to address ethical violations caused by this technology 
or by the professionals. A comprehensive federal investigation 
is required if the staff’s trust in the ethical integrity of the 
security and medical profession being seriously compromised. 
If interrogators dismiss a subject for failing an fMRI scan test, 
they must be able to justify the action against him/her under 
the influence of a Human Rights Act, such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or the UK Human 
Rights Act 1998. Furthermore, a policy can be introduced of 
only screening in case of suspicious activities. In this regard, 
drug testing examples of the Österreichischer 
Gewerkschaftsbund (ÖGB) in Austria, Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) in Germany, and the 
Confédération Générale de Travail (CGT) in France are 
suitable case studies for this approach [42].  
 
10.   Innovation in technology has been a key driver of 
change - the defense and security arenas are no exception. 
Similarly, members of elite unit should be well aware of 
current knowledge, novel literature, latest technologies, 
valuable processes and services about fMRI scanning for the 
purpose of developing image analysis to improve investigating 
methods. It is a major step forward in the action to our national 
                                                        
7 http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-
B457-5C9014916D7A/0/ENGCONV.pdf 
8 http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a12 
9 http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/--
-safework/documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_107797.pdf 
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interests that will continue to play a key role in the 
effectiveness of fMRI as a counterterrorism tool. We also 
recommend that government must push promising research on 
fMRI as they could meet our defense needs through 
collaboration with research sectors and universities to ensure a 
strong research base in this area. This action must be vibrant, 
inventive and innovative that looks most promising in 
screening neuroimaging. Investigators and neuroscientists must 
grasp the opportunities and adapt them quickly and effectively 
as this benefit is critical to our security and sovereignty [42]. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
September 11th has marked an important turning point that 
exposed this new type of human threat that may pose a 
significant risk to critical infrastructure in cloud computing. 
This paper has explored different countermeasures that can be 
taken by an organization to protect themselves against this 
threat. The main objective for this work is to focus on advanced 
security strategies, frameworks, models, multi-layered security 
strategies and assessment methods linked to the overall 
architecture of this paper. Employee screening is central to this 
approach. The Insider Threat Study has also revealed a 
surprisingly high number of malicious insiders with prior 
criminal convictions when hired. Having access to complete 
source of employee history information is the only way the 
interest in performing due diligence to protect key assets and 
the nation can be served. At one hand it is beneficial for a 
general improvement which ultimately leads to higher 
productivity, better workers, increased efficiency and will 
provide an acceptable level of assurance for employees who 
have access to protectively marked critical assets and could 
alleviate the burden of mistrust. Furthermore, the aim of 
introducing this scanning technique is also deterrence from 
malicious activity of any kind. Indeed this approach may deter 
some high risk candidates with criminal/terrorist backgrounds 
from applying for the job at all, which moreover may even save 
money and time in the recruitment process. Similarly, there is a 
great expectation among scientists and counterterrorism 
agencies that workers at critical positions will also realize the 
urgency of the threat and the significance of neuroimaging 
application to national defense. 
More significant, consideration must also be given to the 
government’s purpose in subjecting the suspect to fMRI scan. 
It is important that the state’s interest in interrogating a 
potential malicious insider in a high risk position must be 
justifiable, appropriate and will not curtail substantial civic 
liberty. Whether or not policy makers or civilized society can 
or should allow brain scanning is a matter that will continue to 
be debated for years to come.  However given only the choice 
of deciding of whether or not scan an individual using fMRI 
technology when it may be possible to prevent mass causalities 
through this scan, the state ultimately has to make sensible 
decisions as necessary in order to save lives. 
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